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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Attempted 
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(Supp. 1989), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
Judge, presiding. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ROBERT T. HASTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900021-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Robert T. Haston relies on his opening 
brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the statements of 
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. Appellant Haston 
responds to the State's answer to his opening brief as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State and Appellant Robert Haston both agree that the 
jury instructions should be construed as a whole though the State 
requests this Court to disregard certain instructions because they 
were allegedly not properly raised at trial. However, Robert Haston 
or the trial court, itself, referred to the instructions in such a 
manner that the submitted issues are properly presented for appeal. 
Alternatively, the circumstances of this case are 
"extraordinary," since the jury instructions may have allowed a 
criminal defendant to be convicted under a civil standard of proof. 
The burden of proof is never made clear, especially in regards to 
fully advising the jury on the appropriate elements of the crimes 
charged and the proper burden on the affirmative defenses. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IF THE COURT HAD GIVEN APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS. THERE WAS A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF 
A MORE FAVORABLE RESULT FOR THE DEFENDANT 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
In Point I of its brief, the State argued that Robert 
Haston failed to raise issues connected to his appeal of the 
reasonable doubt instruction, Appellee's brief at 6-7, and that the 
instruction, when construed as a whole, was proper. Appellee's brief 
at 8-11. Appellant Haston disagrees with the State's reading of the 
transcript in regards to its first argument and then argues, in the 
alternative, that the errors are "extraordinary" and subject to 
correction. In addition, Robert Haston concurs in principle with 
the State's second argument (but not in its application) though he 
submits that the instructions, when considered as a whole, further 
support his position. 
A. ROBERT HASTON PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
In its brief, the State acknowledged Robert Haston's 
objection to the reasonable doubt instruction and his cited 
authority, State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989), and State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), Appellee's brief at 6-7, but 
submitted that the instruction was not objected to on the basis of 
its misstatement of law, its inadequate definition, and its 
erroneous standard of proof. Appellee's brief at 6. The State 
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misinterpreted Robert Haston's objection and its relationship to the 
Ireland and Johnson decisions. 
At trial, Robert Haston made his objection to the 
reasonable doubt instruction in the following manner: 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, and I did have one other 
exception, and that was to Instruction No. 7 which the 
Court gave on the definition of — in part of beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that standard. I also proposed an 
instruction on that concept and took language directly 
from the State v. Ireland and State v. Johnson cases 
which are cases that came down from the Utah Supreme 
Court earlier this year. Both of those cases 
indicated that the previously used or generally used 
reasonable doubt instruction did not accurately state 
the law, and I took language directly from those cases 
which I think describes clearly to a jury what that 
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt means, and 
object to the Court giving the instruction that I 
think was the one that the Court itself proposed 
rather than the one that I proposed. 
(T 312-13) (emphasis added). 
Appellant Haston objected to the "generally used" 
instruction, a standard instruction "that the Court itself 
proposed," by requesting the Court to include his proposed language 
into the instruction. Robert Haston sought to clarify the 
misstatements of law, inadequate definitions, and inappropriate 
standards of proof condemned by the two recent Utah Supreme Court 
opinions. In short, Appellant Haston referred to Johnson and 
Ireland in an attempt to remedy "incorrect and perpetua[lly] 
erroneous ideas about the meaning of the term 'beyond a reasonable 
doubt' that is often insinuated into jury instructions." State v. 
Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by 
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Durham and Zimmerman, J.J.); State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 
(Durham, J., joined by Howe and Zimmerman, J.J.) (acknowledging 
Justice Stewart's dissenting criticisms of the language of the 
instruction which "might, by implication, be understood to diminish 
the prosecution's standard of proof"). 
The trial court also understood Robert Haston's objection, 
referring to the "weighty language" criticized by Justice Stewart, 
the analysis of what a "reasonable doubt in fact means," and the 
"lesser standard" determination. (T 313-14). Robert Haston properly 
preserved the issues on appeal. See also Appellant's opening brief 
at 35-36 n.15. 
B. THE EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
REQUIRE CORRECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR 
Assuming, arguendo, that relevant issues were not raised at 
trial, the extraordinary circumstances of this case require 
correction of constitutional error. See, e.g.. State v. Turner, 736 
P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987); cf. Appellant's opening brief, Point 
I.D. In Turner, this Court decided to address the unconstitutional 
nature of jury instructions even though the defense counsel did not 
raise the appropriate arguments at trial. In his appeal, Appellant 
Turner argued that the instructions created a presumption of guilt 
which required him to prove his innocence. The Court of Appeals 
agreed. Id at 1046. 
Holding that the error was not harmless, the Turner Court 
found that the instructions, when read as a whole, did not cure the 
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fatal defects. Id. at 1044-45. Even though " [t]he prosecutions 
'burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of 
the crimes charged7 was recited in Instructions 7 and 9, and 
repeated in Instructions 10 and 11," id. at 1044 n. 1, the Court 
nonetheless found that the "boilerplate explanations" did not 
resolve the "constitutionally infirm" instructions. "Language that 
merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm 
instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity." Id. at 1045; 
United States v. Pinknev, 551 F.2d 1241, 1246 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
("the prejudice caused a defendant by error does not somehow 
evaporate or diminish simply because his counsel has failed to 
object"). 
The error present in the case at bar is just as 
compelling. Before a criminal defendant may be convicted, the State 
must prove each element of the crime charged against him beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). If, as here, 
the jury could have convicted Robert Haston under a lesser standard 
of proof, his right to a fair trial was unconstitutionally 
compromised. General instructions do not necessarily cure specific 
defects found in selected portions of the instructions. See 
generally Appellant's opening brief, Point I.B. 
Another basis for considering the erroneous instructions is 
the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury. As noted 
by the State: 
Accordingly, the judge may, over the objection of the 
defendant's counsel, give any instruction that is in 
proper form, states the law correctly, and does not 
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prejudice the defendant. However, all instructions 
are subject to the general and overreaching rule that 
the judge must make it clear to the jury that the 
defendant has "no particular burden of proof but [is] 
entitled to an acquittal if there [is] any basis in 
the evidence from either side sufficient to create a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant [is] guilty of the 
offense.,f 
Appellee's brief at 8 (citing State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 428 
(Utah 1980)) (citations omitted). 
By negative implication, the converse of the Hansen 
principles should also hold true. A judge may not, over defendants 
objection, give any instruction that is in improper form, states the 
law incorrectly, and does prejudice the defendant. Similarly, a 
judge errs in not making it clear to the jury that the defendant has 
no particular burden of proof but is entitled to an acquittal if 
there is any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to 
create a reasonable doubt. 
The trial court in the case at bar did not properly 
instruct the jury. Besides rejecting Appellant Haston's 
instruction, the court further prejudiced his rights by giving the 
jury an inadequate instruction "that the Court itself proposed." 
(T 313) ; cf. Appellant's opening brief, Point I.e. Moreover, since 
the contested instruction, Instruction No. 7, was an instruction 
from the court, the judge was implicitedly warranting that the 
language used, in its entirety, was proper. See Hansen, 734 P.2d at 
428 ("the judge may . . . give any instruction that is in proper 
form, states the law correctly, and does not prejudice the 
defendant"). Each sentence of the approved instruction is subject 
to scrutiny. 
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C. THE LANGUAGE CHALLENGED BY APPELLANT HAS NEVER BEEN 
SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED BY UTAH'S APPELLATE COURTS 
In an effort to uphold the language of the contested 
instruction, the State claims that a few of the sentences are 
identical to sentences "approved" previously in State v. Tillman. 
750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), and State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 
1989). Appellee's brief at 10-11. Admittedly, some of the language 
used in Tillman and Johnson actually mirror the language used in the 
present case, but the focus of Tillman and Johnson was far different 
from the emphasis here. 
In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), defendant 
Tillman argued that his instruction "impermissibly shifted the 
burden of proof in the guilt phase and the burden of persuasion in 
the penalty phase to him." Id. at 573. The Utah Supreme Court 
disagreed. Agreeing unanimously in their decision concerning the 
reasonable doubt instruction, the Court found that the reasonable 
doubt instruction did not shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant. Id. at 573. 
By contrast, Appellant Haston argues,1 inter alia, that the 
reasonable doubt instruction misstates the law and inadequately 
defines the appropriate standard of proof. He does not interpret 
the reasonable doubt instruction in the same manner as the defendant 
in Tillman. See Appellant's opening brief, Point III. 
1
 Robert Haston's arguments pertaining to the 
impermissible shift in the burden of proof emphasize different 
instructions than the reasonable doubt instruction of State v. 
Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987). See Appellant's opening brief, 
Point II & III. The defects of the other instructions merely 
compound the inadequacies of the reasonable doubt instruction. 
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The State's reading of Tillman has also been eviscerated by 
the recent decision of State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989), 
and State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989)• According to the 
State, because the language of the instruction used in Tillman was 
"approved," the language of the instruction contested here should 
also receive the same "approval." Appellee's brief at 10-11. 
Essentially, the State argues that the prior usage of portions of an 
instruction validates its subsequent use. Not only does the State's 
argument ignore the context of the Tillman decision, it also 
overlooks the fact that the "weighty affairs" language, though 
seemingly "approved" of in Tillman, was subsequently disapproved of 
two years later by State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 
1989), and State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989). 
Consequently, the language previously "approved of" in 
Tillman and Johnson may not necessarily withstand all future 
challenges. For the reasons stated on appeal, the challenged 
language must be strickened or altered to conform with Appellant 
Haston's proposed instruction. See generally Appellant's opening 
brief, Point I. Had the jury received Robert Haston's jury 
instructions, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for him at trial. Johnson. 774 P.2d at 1146 n.16. No 
repetition or redundancy existed; Appellant Haston's jury 
instruction fully and properly stated the law. 
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D. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, WHEN CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE, 
COULD NOT CURE ITS UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS 
While the State and Appellant Haston both agree that jury 
instructions should be construed as a whole, Appellee's brief at 
8-11; Appellant's opening brief at 36, the State nonetheless 
requests this Court to disregard relevant challenges to the 
instructions because "[t]o do so is inviting error," Appellee's 
brief at 21. The State also takes exception to the "[evaluation of] 
each instruction line by line to determine whether they, when read 
in concert, satisfy the [appropriate] standard . . . ." Appellee's 
brief at 13. 
Robert Haston's jury assumably followed each instruction 
presented to them by the trial court. Appellant's opening brief at 
12. The trial judge even advised the jury to interpret the 
instructions themselves. (T 303). Hence, if the instructions, in 
part or as a whole, were improper or subject to an unconstitutional 
interpretation, the jury would be forced to follow their mandate. 
Absent a complete recital of the arguments stated previously in his 
opening brief, Robert Haston simply reemphasizes that the 
prejudicial errors noted in the reasonable doubt instruction were 
exacerbated by the impermissible burden shifting of the intoxication 
instruction. See Appellant's opening brief, Point I & III. The 
depraved indifference instruction and its direct counterpart, the 
Attempted Criminal Homocide instruction, also contained inadequate 
deficiencies. See Appellant's opening brief, Point II. 
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POINT II 
THE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE STANDARD SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN "LIMITED" BY THE COURT 
In its brief, the State acknowledged part of the directive 
of State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), which states "the 
jury should be instructed that it must find 'that the conduct [of 
defendant] evidenced an utter callousness and indifference toward 
human life.,n Appellee's brief at 14. The trial court, however, 
deleted portions of Robert Haston's proposed instruction which 
specifically referred to the language stated in the Standiford 
directive. See Appellant's opening brief, Point II.A. The deleted 
portion read: 
In other words, there must be a knowing doing of an 
uncalled for act in callous disregard of its likely 
harmful effect which is so heinous as to be equivalent 
to a "specific intent" to kill. Examples of this 
might be unmitigated wickedness, extreme inhumanity or 
acts of a high degree of wantoness. 
(R 78) (emphasis added). 
The State attempts to justify the court's deletions by 
arguing that the eguivalent to a 'specific intent' to kill language 
was not part of the Standiford directive. Appellee's brief at 14. 
Yet, the State also concedes the "the phrase in question was quoted 
with approval in fState v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985)] and 
Standiford" though it was not apparently incorporated into any 
suggested jury instruction. Appellee's brief at 14. If, as the 
State argued previously in the reasonable doubt instruction 
discussion, a Court's prior "approval" of language validates its 
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subsequent use, see Appellee's brief, Point I, the court improperly 
excluded the "approved of" language proposed by Robert Haston. 
On the other hand, if the "approved of" language should 
have in fact been deleted, the court erred by deleting the entire 
sentence instead of only the contested portion. The Standiford 
directive still required the inclusion of Haston's references to 
"callous disregard." See Appellant's opening brief at 27 (citing 
State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 264 (Utah 1988)). The deleted 
portion of Appellant's first sentence may have appropriately read: 
"In other words, there must be a knowing doing of an uncalled for 
act in callous disregard of its likely harmful effect." The trial 
court failed to adhere to the Standiford directive. 
The "explanatory portions" of Appellant's proposed 
instruction, the two sentences deleted by the court, explained the 
required elements of each crime. The language of the deleted 
sentences addressed the elements of mens rea and actus reus in a 
complete and understandable manner. The court's instruction, 
though, did not properly address both elements. See Appellant's 
opening brief at 28. If the jury had not been misinformed on the 
applicable law, Robert Haston may have been acquitted or, at most, 
been convicted of manslaughter. 
Moreover, while the jury may have construed the examples 
proposed by Robert Haston as "a highly subjective litany of general 
evils," Appellee's brief at 14-15, at least such an interpretation 
would have properly distinguished the "evil" conduct of attempted 
second degree murder from the "reckless" conduct befitting 
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manslaughter. Cf. Appellant's opening brief at 28-30 nn.10 & 13. 
The legal principles of the court's instruction, (R 94), did not 
convey the "evil" necessary to convict Appellant Haston of attempted 
second degree murder. If the jury had been advised that examples of 
the appropriate culpable conduct were acts done with "unmitigated 
wickedness, extreme inhumanity or . . . a high degree of 
wantonness," they would not have convicted Robert Haston of 
attempted second degree murder. The shooting was not done in a 
wicked or wanton manner. 
As conceded by the State, Robert Haston and a few other 
acquaintances "[spent] much of the day and a half prior to the 
shooting drinking and unwinding at the Se Rancho Motel . . . ." 
Appellee's brief at 4-5. The State and Appellant Haston disagree on 
the circumstances surrounding whether Haston "had[, earlier in the 
day of the shooting,] been carrying the gun around fully loaded, 
swinging it around and popping bullets in and out." Appellee's brief 
at 5. But even if these facts are true it buttresses Appellant's 
position that he did not suddenly produce a gun and shoot a drinking 
buddy because they had an argument. 
In fact, Robert Haston already had the gun out before the 
argument. He was checking the "action," playing with it as he had 
done in the past. (T 225). Nothing in the testimony of the expert 
witness Oscar Hendriksen, a gunsmith, precludes the possibility that 
Haston could have attempted to disarm the gun or check its action 
with his hands near his body, as alluded to by Robert Haston, or 
with his arms stretched out, as submitted by the State. Appellant's 
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opening brief at 5; Appellee's brief at 16. In either case, a 
drunken Robert Haston was unable to control the hammer from striking 
the firing pin and the primer. Appellant's opening brief at 6. The 
gun discharged, wounding Leonard Tate. 
The State contends that "[w]hen [Leonard Tate] asserted 
that [Robert Haston] did not have the nerve to shoot him, [Haston] 
pulled the trigger." Appellee's brief at 5. Tate alleged that he 
told Haston, "'I don't think you got enough guts to pull the 
trigger.' I said it a couple a times." (T 145). However, another 
witness for the State, David Ezzeddine, did not hear the sarcastic 
"prompting," though he was close enough to hear the click of the 
hammer when Haston was checking the action of the gun. (T 82, 112). 
Ezzeddine "just didn't think [the argument] was going to escalate 
into nothing or otherwise [he] would have tried to separate the 
people up." (T 82). The evidence was not overwhelming. 
POINT III 
THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS IMPROPERLY INFLUENCED THE JURY 
The State properly cites State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah 
App. 1989), as the applicable authority for determining whether the 
prosecutor's misstatements of law "were so objectionable as to merit 
reversal." Appellee's brief at 18. Admittedly, Robert Haston did 
not specifically cite Lopez though his arguments nonetheless 
encompassed both prongs of the Lopez test. See Appellant's opening 
brief, Point III. 
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The State concedes that the prosecutor misstated the law, 
"thus satisfying the first prong of the Lopez test." Appellee's 
brief at 20. The second prong was also satisfied because, as noted 
previously, the prosecutor's misstatements "exacerbated the jury's 
confusion over the already defective instructions." Appellant's 
opening brief at 35. The trial court specifically referred to the 
other contested instructions, particularily Instruction Nos. 20 and 
21, in its effort to "cure" the prosecutor's misstatements. 
(T 310-11). Instruction Nos. 20 and 21, the intoxication 
instructions, should therefore be considered by this Court in 
construing the jury instructions "as a whole." Appellant's opening 
brief at 36; Appellee's brief at 8; State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 
(Utah 1989). The wording of Instruction Nos. 20 and 21 have a 
direct bearing on the State's burden of proof and its relationship 
to the reasonable doubt instruction. See Appellant's opening brief, 
Point I & III. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE IMPOSED RESTITUTION. 
A FINE, ATTORNEY FEES. AND THE SURCHARGE 
Robert Haston's financial status and his overall ability to 
pay was never disputed during the sentencing proceeding. Robert 
Haston does not receive any money now and, at the time of 
sentencing, received only social security checks. The government 
checks were minimal as evidenced by his affidavit of impecuniosity, 
(R 126-27), and his need for representation by this office. He did 
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not have any funds remaining after selling his personal property. 
Cf. State v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417 (Utah 1987) (in contrast to Robert 
Haston's indigent status, the court in Snyder ordered restitution 
"in an amount not to exceed $500,000" for a defendant who had 
dissipated $556,600 of an investment fund, had a personal net worth 
of $200,000 at the time of his crime, was employed at the time of 
trial, and had acquired substantial assets). The trial court should 
have found restitution to be "inappropriate" due to Robert Haston's 
status but concluded instead that "to [not] order [restitution] 
would be viewed as . . . some sort of condonation of the conduct of 
Mr. Haston . . . ." (T 323). No other reasons were stated. The 
court's actions and other conclusory comments were improper. See 
Appellant's opening brief, Point IV. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Haston respectfully 
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to 
the trial court for a new trial or dismissal. 
SUBMITTED this l(f day of August, 1990. 
JTtiC\. fr^l 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ON&LD S . TU R A  . flTNO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this (k day of August, 1990. 
DNALD S . RO  . FUJINO 
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DELIVERED by this day 
of August, 1990. 
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